











Some Second Thoughts on Monopolistic 
Distortions and Endogenous Growth 
 
 









Editor: Prof. Regina T. Riphahn, Ph.D.   
Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg 
© Lutz G. Arnold, Christian Bauer
 










93 040 Regensburg, Germany
christian.bauer@wiwi.uni-r.de
Abstract
The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition is that there is a tradeoﬀ between
static welfare and long-term growth. This paper reconsiders this basic proposition in an increasing
product variety endogenous growth model with competitive markets for “old” innovative products
and for a traditional good. We shed light on some implications of monopolistic distortions which
tend to be ignored by standard models. First, no growth may be better than some growth, since
modest positive growth potentially requires sizeable static welfare losses. Second, the economy may
converge to a steady state with zero growth, even though another (saddle-point stable) steady state
with positive growth exists if the initial share of “cheap” competitive markets is suﬃciently high,
as this implies a relatively low demand for “expensive” innovative goods. Third, such a “no-growth
trap” may happen in a world economy made up of several countries engaged in free trade with
each other. The policy implications are that growth-enhancing policies may be misguided and that
quick deregulation as well as quick trade liberalization can lead to stagnation in the long term.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F15, F43, O31, O34, O41
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11 Introduction
The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition, taught in introductory economics
courses, is that there is a tradeoﬀ between static welfare and long-term growth: perfect competition
brings about static eﬃciency but undermines the incentives to invest in the innovation of new goods,
services, and processes (see, e.g., Blanchard, 2006, p. 256).1 This paper highlights several important
macroeconomic implications of this basic proposition. To do so, we consider the standard Grossman-
Helpman (1991, Ch. 3) increasing variety endogenous growth model augmented to include erosion
of monopoly power due to (exogenous) imitation and a non-innovative traditional sector. Neither of
these two extensions is novel. Textbook expositions can be found, for instance, in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004, Section 6.2, pp. 305 ﬀ.) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Section 5.3, pp. 130 ﬀ.),
respectively.2 However, the implications of the resulting monopolistic distortions for model dynamics
and welfare are not fully worked out. We prove three results on the model’s dynamics and welfare
properties and derive corollaries which characterize second-best competition policies.
The ﬁrst result is directly concerned with the tradeoﬀ between static welfare and the incentives to
innovate. In the Grossman-Helpman (1991, Ch. 3) model (i.e., without competitive markets), the
equilibrium growth rate is lower than optimal, and no growth cannot be better than some growth. We
show that, in our model, it can be. This is because there is a static welfare loss (of non-inﬁnitesimal size)
due to monopoly pricing in the innovative sector. If the incentives provided by monopoly proﬁts bring
about only a modest growth rate, it is preferable to dispense with growth altogether and implement
static eﬃciency instead. The implication for economic policy is that so as to achieve a modest growth
rate, it may not be worthwhile incurring the associated cost in terms of static welfare losses. This
ﬁnding has not been emphasized in models of growth with competitive markets.
The second result says that the economy may get stuck in a “no-growth trap” (poverty trap): the
unique perfect-foresight equilibrium possibly entails convergence to a steady state with zero growth,
even though another (locally) saddle-point stable steady state with positive growth exists. This will
happen if the initial share of competitive markets is suﬃciently high.3 In that case, a potential innovator
1Hellwig and Irmen (2001) point out that perfect competition per se does not rule out innovation-driven growth:
positive proﬁt and costly innovation are compatible with perfect competition in the presence of diminishing returns to
scale and inframarginal rents (see also the discussion in Romer, 1990, pp. S75-S77).
2For models with exogenous imitation, see also Rustichini and Schmitz (1991), Kwan and Lai (2003), and Pelka (2005,
Chapter 7). In Segerstrom (1991) and Walz (1995), imitation is endogenous. Perez-Sebastian (2000) shows that “growth
miracles” can be explained in a model that interprets the process of imitation as the costly adaption of knowledge created
abroad.
3The possibility of a no-growth trap is ignored in the papers with exogenous imitation mentioned in footnote 2 except
2would compete with many relatively cheap products, so that it does not pay to innovate. This result
is related to the literature on poverty traps, surveyed by Azariadis and Stachurski (2005). As for
economic policy, it implies that quick deregulation, which turns many monopolistic markets (e.g.,
state monopolies) into perfectly competitive markets simultaneously may be very detrimental to long-
term growth, since innovating becomes unattractive as the incumbent competitive producers attract
the major part of the goods demand.
The second result is reminiscent of Tang and W¨ alde’s (2001) ﬁnding that a two-country world economy
may ﬁnd itself in a no-growth trap if there are suﬃciently many competitive markets due to a large
initial overlap of products, invented before trade is opened up between the countries. Our third result
is concerned with the open-economy version of our model and relates our model to Tang and W¨ alde’s
(2001). Adapting the analysis in Arnold (2007) appropriately, we prove that, under certain conditions,
the world economy made up of several (identical) countries replicates the equilibrium of the hypotheti-
cal integrated economy (that would prevail if national borders did not exist). Together with the second
result, it follows immediately that if the model parameters are such that the no-growth trap occurs in
the integrated economy, then the no-growth trap is also an equilibrium of the world economy if there
are suﬃciently many competitive markets due to a large initial overlap of products. From a policy
point of view, it follows that, like quick deregulation in a closed economy, quick trade liberalization
can lead to stagnation in the long term: the opening up of free trade at a point in time when the
overlap exceeds the threshold number of competitive markets, above which the (world) economy is
stuck in a no-growth trap, leads to long-term stagnation.
In relating our model to the existing literature, several cautionary notes are in order. First, a huge and
growing literature addresses the issue of competition between several ﬁrms in given markets and the
relation between the intensity of competition and the pace of equilibrium growth. For instance, Aghion
et al. (2001) demonstrate that more intense competition may spur growth in a model with innovation
by both technological leaders and laggards, as it induces ﬁrms to try to escape ﬁerce competition. Such
eﬀects are not present in our model, in which markets are either monopolies or perfectly competitive.
Our motivation is that this is the easiest way of approaching the question of how distortions which
stem from the fact that some markets are less competitive than others aﬀect model dynamics.
Second, in their inﬂuential “Case Against Intellectual Property”, Boldrin and Levine argue that “the
case against monopoly rests less upon the welfare triangle from monopoly pricing than upon the
rent-seeking activity used to get and keep a monopoly” (Boldrin and Levine, 2002, p. 211). This de-
in Pelka (2005, Chapter 7). The part of the present paper concerned with the possibility of a no-growth trap clariﬁes
and extends Pelka’s (2005, Chapter 7) analysis.
3emphasis of monopoly distortions is at least debatable. At any rate, the two eﬀects are complementary,
and including the rent seeking problems emphasized by Boldrin and Levine would strengthen our
conclusions.
Third, the terms deregulation and liberalization can be given diﬀerent meanings. We call a change
from monopoly to perfect competition deregulation (since our model is an increasing variety model,
the market then remains competitive indeﬁnitely). As an example of a diﬀerent deﬁnition, see B¨ uttner
(2006). She considers a quality upgrading model in which some goods are publicly provided (without
being upgraded) at monopoly prices and deﬁnes deregulation as a decrease in the number of such
monopolies. Deregulation is then unambiguously conducive to growth. In the open economy version
of our model, liberalization means a switch from no international trade at all to unrestricted free
trade. A more general formulation would allow for ﬁnite iceberg costs and deﬁne trade liberalization
as a decrease in the iceberg costs (see, e.g., Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007, or Gustafsson and
Segerstrom, 2007) or introduce tariﬀs explicitly (as, e.g., in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999, or
Baldwin and Forslid, 1999, 2000).
Fourth, it is well known that in models with quality upgrading as the source of growth, contrary to
increasing variety models, growth can be too fast and zero growth can be preferable when equilibrium
growth is positive (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Ch. 4, pp. 103-106). To highlight that it
is the monopolistic distortions which are responsible for our ﬁrst result, we choose as our point of
departure an expanding variety growth model, so that growth cannot be too fast in the absence of
competitive markets.
Fifth, the Grossman-Helpman (1991, Ch. 3) model is a ﬁrst-generation R&D model, which displays
scale eﬀects. Time series observations pose a great challenge to such models (see Jones, 1995a) and have
led to the development of non-scale growth models, such as Jones (1995b), Young (1998), or Arnold
(1998).4 A relatively general lesson of these models is that growth rates are much less responsive to
changes in the model parameters than models with scale eﬀects indicate.5 Our motivation for using
a ﬁrst-generation model is that this limits the number of state variables in such a way that we can
carry out the (phase diagram) analysis of the model’s global dynamic behavior which is necessary in
order to identify a no-growth trap. This appears acceptable in view of the fact that the presence of a
no-growth trap is a property of the model’s qualitative dynamic behavior, which should not relate to
4Young (1998) emphasizes that an increase in the labor force may be absorbed by a sector of the economy that does
not spur long-term growth. Jones (1995b) assumes diminishing returns to knowledge in the creation of new knowledge,
in which case population growth is required to sustain long-term growth. Arnold (1998) replaces population growth with
human capital accumulation.
5See, however, Howitt (1999).
4the responsiveness of the steady-state growth rate to changes in model parameters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The growth
equilibrium is derived in Section 3. Section 4 proves our main results on growth and competition.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
There is a continuum of mass one of identical households. Each household inelastically supplies L units
of labor, the only primary factor of production. Their intertemporal utility is U =
R ∞
0 e−ρt[σ lnX +
(1 − σ)lnY ]dt, where X and Y are the quantities consumed of two homogeneous goods, x and y
(and ρ > 0, 0 < σ < 1).6 Good x is produced using a set of intermediates, j, according to the
production function X = [
R n
0 x(j)αdj]1/α, where x(j) is the input of intermediate j, n is the “number”
of producible intermediates, and 0 < α < 1. Each producible intermediate, j, is obtained one-to-one
from labor. The “traditional” good y is also obtained one-to-one from labor: Y = LY , where LY is
labor employed in the production of y (one may think of services with less scope for innovation than
in manufacturing). Blueprints for new intermediates are invented in R&D according to ˙ n = nLR/a
(with a > 0), where LR is employment in R&D (there are scale eﬀects). As for market structure,
we assume that all markets are perfectly competitive except for the markets for “new” intermediates.
Immediately after the development of a new variety, the innovator is a monopolist (due to either patent
protection or the fact that other agents are not yet able technologically to imitate the intermediate).
Subsequently, in any short time interval dt the innovator loses his monopoly with probability ψ dt
(due to the loss of patent protection or of technological leadership), in which case the market becomes
perfectly competitive. ψ (≥ 0) is called the rate of imitation. Consequently, letting nm and nc denote
the “numbers” of monopolistic and competitive markets for intermediate goods, respectively, we have
˙ nc = ψnm, n = nc + nm. (1)
As mentioned in the Introduction, the presence of competitive markets (for “old” innovative goods
and for the traditional good) is the only diﬀerence to Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 3). Our main
results, explained in the Introduction, go through for ψ = 0. The purpose of including ψ > 0, at the
cost of some additional complexity, is two-fold. First, with ψ = 0, obviously, the number of competitive
innovative goods markets converges to zero, which runs counter our focus on the role of competitive
versus monopolistic markets. Second, by allowing for positive values, we can use ψ as a measure of
6The time argument is suppressed here and in what follows whenever this does not cause confusion.
5the strength of intellectual property rights, which will be convenient in the policy experiments we
consider.
3 Equilibrium
Using aggregate expenditure as the num´ eraire, utility maximization yields
pXX = σ, pY Y = 1 − σ, r = ρ, (2)
where pX and pY are the prices of goods x and y, respectively, and r is the interest rate. Cost
minimization in the x-sector yields the input coeﬃcient a(j) = p(j)−[
R n
0 p(j0)1−dj0]/(1−) for good
j, where p(j) is the price of intermediate j and  ≡ 1/(1−α). Consequently, the unit production cost
and, because of perfect competition, the price of good x is pX = [
R n
0 p(j)1−dj]1/(1−). The x-sector’s
demand for intermediate j is x(j) = a(j)X. The price elasticity of demand is  (< ∞). Monopolists
in the intermediate goods sector maximize proﬁt, π, given these demand functions. Letting pm and pc
denote the prices in monopolistic and competitive intermediate goods markets, respectively, and xm





, pc = w, π = (1 − α)pmxm. (3)
Substituting the pricing rules into the expression for the input coeﬃcients, a(j), the demands x(j) =
a(j)X can be rewritten as
xm = α  
nc + α−1nm
− 1





where xc denotes the output of competitively supplied intermediates. Moreover, substituting the pric-
ing rules in (3) into pX = [
R n
0 p(j)1−dj]1/(1−) and using the fact that good y is obtained one-to-one





−1 w, pY = w. (5)
Using the fact that, as of time t, a monopolist’s probability of still being a monopolist at τ (≥ t) is












Imitation acts like additional discounting. Free entry into R&D requires
wa ≥ nv, with equality if ˙ n > 0. (7)




+ ncxc + nmxm + Y. (8)
Equations (1)-(8) comprise a system of 15 equations in 15 unknowns: nc, nm, n, pX, X, pY , Y , r, pm,
w, pc, π, xm, xc, and v.7 A vector of these 15 variables which solves (1)-(8) for all t is an equilibrium.
Let θ ≡ nc/n and g = ˙ n/n denote the proportion of intermediate goods markets which are competitive
and the growth rate of the “number” of intermediates, respectively. Further, let V ≡ 1/(nv). Using









θ(1 − α) + α





Diﬀerentiating the deﬁnition of θ and using (1) yields
˙ θ = (1 − θ)ψ − θg. (10)




[1 − θ(1 − α1−)]n
.
Diﬀerentiating the deﬁnition of V and (6) with respect to time, eliminating ˙ v, and using (2) and the





1 − θ(1 − α1−)
V − (ρ + ψ + g). (11)
Given (9), equations (10) and (11) comprise an autonomous system of ordinary diﬀerential equations
in θ and V . In the present section, we analyze this system of equations. The ﬁndings will be used in
Section 4 to bring forth our main results. As mentioned above, it is possible to focus on the (easier)
case ψ = 0.




1 − θ(1 − α1−)
1 − θ[1 − α1− − (1 − α)σ] − (1 − α)σ
≡ ˜ V (θ) (12)
and g = 0 otherwise. ˜ V (θ) is continuous and strictly decreasing for θ ∈ [0,1], with ˜ V (0) = (L/a)/[1 −
(1 − α)σ] and ˜ V (1) = L/a.
7The budget constraint d(nmv)/dt = rnmv + wL − 1 represents another equation in the same variables, but as usual
in general equilibrium theory, one of the 16 equations can be obtained from the other 15, so that we have as many
equations as unknowns.
7Figure 1: Dynamics in case 1 (left panel: ψ > 0, right panel: ψ = 0)
Consider ﬁrst the g = 0-region. According to (11), V is constant for V = 0 and for
V = (ρ + ψ)
1 − θ(1 − α1−)
(1 − α)σ
≡ ¯ V0(θ), (13)
where ¯ V0(0) = (ρ + ψ)/[(1 − α)σ], ¯ V0(1) = (ρ + ψ)/[(1 − α)α−1σ], and ¯ V 0
0(θ) > 0. ˙ V is positive for
V > ¯ V0(θ) and negative for V < ¯ V0(θ). For ψ > 0, from (10) and g = 0, θ is constant or increases
depending on whether θ = 1 or θ < 1, respectively. ψ = 0, together with g = 0, implies ˙ θ = 0.






In this case, ¯ V0(1) < ˜ V (1). As ¯ V 0
0(θ) > 0 > ˜ V 0(θ) for all θ ∈ [0,1], it follows that ¯ V0(θ) < ˜ V (θ) and,
hence, ˙ V /V > 0 for all θ ∈ [0,1]. That is, trajectories in the g = 0-region point to the north-east for





< 1 − (1 − α)σ. (15)
Here, ¯ V0(0) > ˜ V (0), so that the curve ¯ V0(θ) is located above the curve ˜ V (θ). V rises above and falls
below ¯ V0(θ). Suppose ψ > 0. Then, the point (θ,V ) = (1, ¯ V0(1)) is a steady state. As can be seen from
the left panel of Figure 2, for each θ ∈ [0,1], there exists a unique path converging to this steady state.
For ψ = 0, we have (˙ θ, ˙ V ) = (0,0) for all (θ, ¯ V0(θ)). Hence, for any initial proportion of competitive
markets, θ(0), there is a steady state (θ,V ) = (θ(0), ¯ V0(θ(0))) (see the right panel of Figure 2).
Case 3:





8Figure 2: Dynamics in case 2 (left panel: ψ > 0, right panel: ψ = 0)
In this, intermediate, case the curves ¯ V0(θ) and ˜ V (θ) intersect for some θ ∈ [0,1].8 As in case 2, V
rises above ¯ V0(θ) and falls below the curve (see Figure 3).








1 − θ(1 − α1−)
1 − θ[1 − α1− − (1 − α)σ]
≡ ¯ V (θ). (17)
¯ V (0) = ρ+ψ +L/a, ¯ V (1) = (ρ+ψ +L/a)/[1+(1−α)α−1σ], and ¯ V 0(θ) < 0 for all θ ∈ [0,1]. V rises










1 − θ(1 − α1−)
1 − θ[1 − α1− − (1 − α)σ] − (1 − α)σ
≡ Vθ(θ). (18)
Using (12), we can rewrite Vθ(θ) as




1 − θ(1 − α1−)
1 − θ[1 − α1− − (1 − α)σ] − (1 − α)σ
. (19)
For ψ > 0, from (18) and (19), we have Vθ(θ) = 0 for (0 <) θ = ψ/(ψ + L/a) (< 1) and for
θ = 1/(1 − α1−) (< 0). Moreover, Vθ(θ) → −∞ as θ → 0 from above, Vθ is continuous on θ ∈ (0,1],
V 0
θ(1) = ψ − (L/a)α−1(1 − α)σ, and Vθ(θ) < ˜ V (θ) for all θ ∈ (0,1). For ψ = 0, on the other hand,
Vθ(θ) = ˜ V (θ) for all θ and Vθ(1) = ˜ V (1) = L/a.
Case 1: Suppose ψ > 0. Then, the case distinction (14) implies ¯ V (θ) < ˜ V (θ) for all θ ∈ [0,1] (since
¯ V (0) < ˜ V (0) and ¯ V (θ) = ˜ V (θ) for some θ ∈ (0,1] contradicts the case distinction). Moreover, Vθ(θ) <
˜ V (θ) for all θ ∈ (0,1), and Vθ(1) = ˜ V (1) (i.e., Vθ(1) > ¯ V (1)). It follows that the stationary loci ¯ V (θ)
8Notice that the terminology is somewhat loose with regard to a common point at one of the boundaries, θ = 0 or
θ = 1 (i.e., when one equality in (16) is strict).
9Figure 3: Dynamics in case 3 (upper panels: ψ > 0, lower panel: ψ = 0)
10and Vθ(θ) intersect an odd number of times on (0,1). The fact that V 0
θ(1) < 0 implies that Vθ(θ)
has an interior local maximum on (0,1]. From (17) and (18), ¯ V (θ) = Vθ(θ) for θ = 1/(1 − α1−)
(< 0) and for those θ’s which satisfy the equality ¯ V (θ)/[1 − θ(1 − α1−)] = Vθ(θ)/[1 − θ(1 − α1−)].
This is a quadratic equation, with an even number of real-valued solutions. It follows that ¯ V (θ) and
Vθ(θ) intersect exactly once in the interval [0,1], which proves that a unique steady state exists in the
g > 0-region. As can be seen from the left panel of Figure 1, the steady state is a saddle point. For
ψ = 0, we have ˙ θ/θ = −g < 0. (θ,V ) = (0, ¯ V (0)) is the unique steady state in the g > 0-region and
is a saddle point (see the right panel of Figure 1). For each θ ∈ [0,1], there exists a unique trajectory
converging to the steady state both for ψ > 0 and for ψ = 0. Divergent paths can be ruled out
adapting the arguments put forward by Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 61): paths starting above
the saddle path yield V → ∞ and θ → θ0 > 0, where θ0 = 1 if ψ > 0 (see Figure 1). However, once
the economy is in the g = 0-region, πn = σ(1 − α)/[1 − θ(1 − α1−)] ≥ σ(1 − α)α−1 and, from (6),
vn ≥ σ(1 − α)α−1/(ρ + ψ). This contradicts V → ∞. Paths starting below the saddle path converge
to (θ,V ) = (ψ/(ψ+L/a),0) (see Figure 1). As π ≤ σ(1−α)/n, we have nv ≤ σ(1−α)/(ρ+ψ), which
contradicts V → 0.
Case 2: In the g = 0-region, ˙ V /V < 0 below the curve ¯ V0(θ). A fortiori, from (11), ˙ V /V < 0 in
the g > 0-region. As in case 1, if ψ > 0, the ˙ θ = 0-locus diverges to −∞ as θ → 0 from above
and satisﬁes Vθ(1) = ˜ V (θ). As can be seen from the left panel in Figure 2, all paths except the one
converging to (θ,V ) = (1, ¯ V0(1)) violate perfect foresight analogously to the divergent paths in case
1. For ψ = 0, given a starting value θ(0), the only trajectory consistent with perfect foresight entails
that the economy jumps to the steady state (θ(0),V0(θ(0))).
Case 3: In this intermediate case, the curves ¯ V0(θ) and ˜ V (θ) intersect for some θ ∈ [0,1]. From (11),
the stationary locus for V is continuous on the border between positive and zero growth, ˜ V (θ). When
the ﬁrst inequality in (16) is strict, we have ¯ V (0) = ˜ V (0). For ψ > 0, by the arguments put forward
in case 2, the number of intersections of ¯ V (θ) and Vθ(θ) in the g > 0-region is two (see the upper
left panel of Figure 3) or zero (see the upper right panel of Figure 3).9 In the former subcase (two
intersections), let θc denote the abscissa value of the south-eastern intersection. Then, for each θ < θc,
the unique trajectory consistent with perfect foresight converges to the north-western steady state, and
for each θ > θc, the unique trajectory consistent with perfect foresight converges to (θ,V ) = (1, ¯ V0(1)).
Similarly, in case of ψ = 0, let θc denote the θ-value at which the ˙ V = 0-locus intersects the g = 0-
boundary, ˜ V (θ). For θ(0) < θc, the economy converges to (0, ¯ V (0)). By contrast, for θ(0) > θc, the
9The dynamics are similar in all respects important for our purposes if Vθ(θ) is montonically increasing, rather than
taking on a maximum on θ ∈ (0,1].
11economy jumps to (θ(0), ¯ Vθ(θ(0))) (see the lower panel of Figure 3).
4 Results
In this section, we use our ﬁndings about the model dynamics to prove three propositions about growth
and welfare and derive corollaries addressing the issue of second-best competition policies mentioned
in the Introduction.
The ﬁrst result states that no growth may be better than some growth. To illustrate this, suppose it
is possible to eﬀectively protect monopolies indeﬁnitely, so that ψ = 0. Suppose L is suﬃciently large
so that (14) or (16) holds for ψ = 0, i.e., case 1 or case 3 applies, and there is a steady state with
positive growth. We know from Section 3 that if θ(0) = 0, the economy settles down at a steady state
with θ(t) = 0 for all t (see the right panel of Figure 1 and the lower panel of Figure 3, respectively).
From (9) and (11) with ˙ θ = 0, it follows that
g = (1 − α)σ
L
a
− [1 − (1 − α)σ]ρ. (20)
Let L+ denote the value for L such that g = 0 for L ≤ L+ and g > 0 for L > L+ (L = L+ implies








PROPOSITION 1 (“beneﬁts of no growth”): Suppose (14) or (16) holds for ψ = 0 (i.e., L ≥ L+).
Then, there exists Lc (> L+) such that for L ∈ (L+,Lc), intertemporal utility with competitive prices,
full employment, θ(t) = 1, and g(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0 is higher than in the equilibrium with θ(t) = 0
and g(t) > 0 given by (20) for all t ≥ 0.10
Proof: Let θ and g be constant. Furthermore, assume prices are set competitively in the y-sector and in
nc intermediate goods markets, while monopoly prices are charged in nm intermediate goods markets.









(ncxc)αθ1−α + (nmxm)α(1 − θ)1−α






The important point to notice is that monopoly pricing in the intermediate goods sector causes the
usual static welfare loss. To see this, notice that an allocation of labor across the intermediates and
good y that maximizes static welfare requires symmetry across the intermediates (i.e., x(j) = x for all
10In Grossman and Helpman’s (1991, Ch. 4) quality upgrading model, equilibrium growth is positive although zero
growth would be preferable if ρa/L lies in the interval (logλ,λ − 1), where λ (> 1) is the size of a quality jump.
12Figure 4: Comparing growth and no-growth equilibria
j ∈ [0,n]) and nx/Y = σ/(1 − σ). For θ(t) = 1, as nc(t) = n(t), the symmetry condition is satisﬁed.
And from zero proﬁt in x- and y-production (i.e., ncxc = σ/w and Y = (1 − σ)/w, respectively), the
allocation of labor is eﬃcient. Next, consider the allocation with θ(t) = 0 and g(t) > 0. Equations
(2)-(5) and θ = 0 imply nx/Y = ασ/(1 − σ). That is, markup pricing leads to too low a level of
x-production relative to y.
Let U0 denote the intertemporal utility level with θ(t) = g(t) = 0 and U+ the utility level obtained in
the steady-state equilibrium with θ(t) = 1 and g(t) > 0 given by (20). Let L → L+ from above. By the
deﬁnition of L+, the growth rate, g, converges to zero. Given that this implies that the combined labor
input in x- and y-production converges to L, the static welfare loss is of non-inﬁnitesimal magnitude.
Consequently, U0 > U+ as L → L+ from above.11 The right-hand side of (21) is concave in ncxc and in
nmxm but linear in g (which is itself linear in L, see (20)). So there is an Lc > L+ such that U+ ≥ U0
for L ≥ Lc (see Figure 4). Q.E.D.
A direct corollary of Proposition 1 is that no patent protection may be preferable to very strict patent
protection. Suppose by giving up patent protection, the policymaker can raise the imitation rate from
ψ = 0 to ψ = ¯ ψ (> 0). Consider the extreme case in which imitators learn instantaneously how to
copy new innovations, so that ¯ ψ → ∞.
COROLLARY 1 (“beneﬁts of preventing growth”): For L slightly greater than Lc, θ(0) = 0, and
11It is possible (albeit not necessary) to calculate the diﬀerence in welfare levels explicitly. Simple manipulations show
that ρU0 − [(1 − α)/α]σ lnn(0) = lnL + σ lnσ + (1 − σ)ln(1 − σ) and ρU+ − [(1 − α)/α]σ lnn(0) = lnL + σ lnσ + (1 −
σ)ln(1 − σ) + σ lnα − ln[1 − (1 − α)σ] as g goes to zero. So ρ(U0 − U+) = ln[1 − (1 − α)σ] − σ lnα as g goes to zero.
That U0 − U+ is strictly positive follows from the fact that it equals zero for σ = 0 and σ = 1 and is strictly concave.
The fact that U0 − U+ = 0 for σ = 1 highlights that the presence of a traditional sector is essential for our argument.
Monopolistic price setting per se does not cause a static distortion; distortions obtain when diﬀerent goods have diﬀerent
markups (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991, p. 70).
13¯ ψ → ∞, intertemporal utility is higher with ψ = ¯ ψ than with ψ = 0.
Proof: As explained above, with ψ = 0, the economy settles down at a steady state with positive
growth, θ = 0, and, hence, with intertemporal utility U+ (the ﬁrst inequality in (16) is strict). As ψ
rises suﬃciently far, (15) becomes valid and case 2 applies. As illustrated by the left panel of Figure
2, zero growth prevails, and the economy converges towards (1, ¯ V0(1)). For ¯ ψ → ∞, the convergence
process becomes inﬁnitely short, so that θ quickly goes to unity and intertemporal utility is close to
U0. Since, by Proposition 1, U0 > U+ for L slightly greater than Lc, giving up patent protection raises
welfare. Q.E.D.
Numerical results, admittedly, suggest that some growth is better than no growth. However, it is
possible to construct counterexamples with parameter values that should not be deemed unrealistic
a priori. For instance, let ρ = 0.04, α = 5/8 (which gives rise to the standard 60% markup), a = 1,
and n(0) = 1. We let σ = 0.999 or σ = 0.5 and choose L such that without imitation (i.e., if ψ = 0)
g = 0.5%, which implies 0.3% growth in the x-sector’s real output (i.e., L = 0.0801 or L = 0.2,
respectively). For σ = 0.999, we get U0 = −63.3097 < −63.0515 = U+. For σ = 0.5, on the other
hand, U0 = −57.5646 > −57.9446 = U+. So the economy with σ = 0.5 (but not the economy with
σ close to unity) would be willing to give up long-term manufacturing output growth of 0.3% in
exchange for static eﬃciency. That is, raising the imitation rate from zero to inﬁnity is beneﬁcial to
this economy’s representative consumer.
Our second proposition states that the economy may get stuck in a “no-growth” trap (even though
there exists a steady state with positive growth) due to too much competition initially.
PROPOSITION 2 (“no-growth trap”): Suppose (16) holds (case 3). Suppose further that either ψ > 0
and ¯ V (θ) and Vθ(θ) intersect twice in the g > 0-region, or else ψ = 0. Then, g(t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0 if
θ(0) < θc, while there is tc ≥ 0 such that g(t) = 0 for all t ≥ tc if θ(0) > θc.
Proof: This simply rephrases the results of the analysis of case 3 in Section 3. If ψ > 0, tc (> 0) is the
point in time at which the trajectory converging to (1, ¯ V0(1)) crosses the g = 0-boundary. tc = 0 for
ψ = 0 (see the upper left and the lower panels of Figure 3, respectively). Q.E.D.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is: the lower its competitors’ prices, the lower the share of aggregate
demand that accrues to a potential innovator. If too many competitors supply at competitive prices, it
does not pay to innovate, even though it would pay if the competitors’ products were more expensive.
As an example, let ρ = 0.02, ψ = 0.01, α = 0.6, a = 1, σ = 1, and L = 0.15. This gives rise to
case 3, and the stationary loci for V and θ intersect twice in the g > 0-region, at θ = 0.4352 and
θ = 0.7404 ≡ θc. The growth rate corresponding to the steady state with θ = 0.4352 is g = 1.30%,
14which implies 0.87% growth of the x-sector. So this economy fails to reach a steady state with 0.87%
manufacturing output growth if the initial proportion of competitive markets exceeds 74.04%.
The implication of Proposition 2 for competition policy is that quick deregulation of monopolies may
do more harm than good, as it makes it harder for a potential innovator to compete with incumbent
producers. To illustrate this, consider an emerging economy with state monopolies in θm intermediate
goods markets initially. Assume θm < θc. Without deregulation, θ(0) = θm, and the economy con-
verges to the saddle-point stable steady state, in which growth is positive. Suppose, by contrast, the
government deregulates some of the monopolies, in which case they instantaneously become perfectly
competitive. That is, the government determines a starting value θ(0) in the interval [θm,1] (3 θc).
From Proposition 2, we have:
COROLLARY 2 (“perils of quick liberalization”): Let the conditions of Proposition 2 be satisﬁed. If
markets are deregulated such that θ(0) > θc, then there is a tc > 0 such that g(t) = 0 for all t ≥ tc,
while g(t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0 without deregulation.
In the example above, if θm = 74%, then deregulating a further 0.1% of the markets means giving up
0.87% long-term manufacturing growth.
Tang and W¨ alde (2001) show that a no-growth trap is possible in the two-country open economy
version of our model with σ = 1 and ψ = 0. Proposition 2 is strongly reminiscent of their ﬁnding.
We now turn to the m-country open economy version of our model. We show that under certain
conditions the m-country economy behaves exactly identically to the hypothetical integrated economy
that occurs in the absence of national borders (i.e., the restrictions on labor movements they imply).
To do so, we generalize the analysis in Arnold (2007) (which assumes ψ = 0). The Tang-W¨ alde
(2001) result is then obtained as a corollary to this replication theorem.12 Consider a world economy
made up of m (≥ 2) countries of the type introduced in Section 2 (i.e., with identical parameter
values everywhere). Variables referring to individual countries, i, are distinguished by a superscript
i (= 1,...,m). Variables without the superscript are world aggregates. We assume that knowledge
spillovers in R&D are international in scope, so that the R&D technologies become ˙ ni = nLi
R/a.
An important issue is which products can be produced where. We start with the assumptions least
conducive to the possibility of replication: non-imitated goods have to be produced where they were
invented, and imitation is also “local”, in that in short time intervals, dt, a fraction (Li/L)ψ dt of
the nm goods not yet imitated before becomes producible in country i: ˙ ni
c = (Li/L)ψnm. We say
that replication of the equilibrium of the integrated economy (ignoring national borders that inhibit
movements of labor across borders) is feasible if this allocation is an equilibrium of the world economy
12Our result also generalizes Tang and W¨ alde (2001), to the cases σ > 0 and m > 2.
15(with national borders) as well.
PROPOSITION 3 (“replication”): If
Li − ni
c(t)xc(t) − ni
m(t)xm(t) ≥ 0, for all i = 1,...,m, t ≥ 0, (22)
then replication is feasible.
Proof: Ignoring national borders, the equilibrium obeys equations (1)-(8) in Section 3 (where L ≡
Pm
i=1 Li). We have to show that this set of equations is also satisﬁed in the world economy with
national borders. Equation (1) follows from adding up ˙ ni
c = (Li/L)ψnm for all i = 1,...,m. The
conditions for utility maximization in (2) are unaﬀected by the presence of national borders. Since
the cost minimization problem is also unchanged, so are the input coeﬃcients, a(j), the zero proﬁt
condition pX = [
R n
0 p(j)1−dj]1/(1−), the demands for intermediates x(j) = a(j)X, and, therefore, the
pricing rules and ensuing proﬁt in (3) and the expressions for xm and xc in (4) (where X is the world
production of good x, xm is the output of any monopolistically supplied intermediate, and xc is the
output level of any competitively supplied intermediate). Evidently, the equations for pricing of the
ﬁnal goods, the value of an innovation, and free entry into R&D, (i.e., (5)-(7), respectively) hold true






mxm + Y i. (23)
Assumption (22) ensures that for each country, i, given ni
c and ni
m, there exist ˙ ni ≥ 0 and Y i ≥ 0 such
that (23) is satisﬁed. Adding up (23) for all i = 1,...,m yields (8). Q.E.D.
Propositions 2 and 3 can be jointly used to prove a generalized version of the Tang-W¨ alde (2001)
theorem on the existence of a no-growth trap due to the opening up of international trade between
several countries. To do so, assume that at time t = 0, m countries with free international ﬂows
of knowledge between them start to engage in trade with each other. Suppose that, while still in
autarky (i.e., before time t = 0), the producers do not take into account the possibility of future trade
liberalization, so that they do not have an incentive to avoid the invention of identical intermediates
in diﬀerent countries (“duplication”). Let n denote the total “number” of diﬀerent intermediates
producible somewhere in the world economy and nd the “number” of duplicated intermediates at the
point in time when trade is liberalized. From Propositions 2 and 3, we obtain:
COROLLARY 3 (generalization of Tang and W¨ alde, 2001): Let the conditions of Proposition 2 be
satisﬁed, and (22) holds. Then the no-growth trap described in Proposition 2 is an equilibrium of the
world economy if nd/n > θc.
16From a policy point of view, this corollary implies that, like quick deregulation in a closed economy,
quick trade liberalization can lead to stagnation in the long term: if countries decide to liberalize trade
at a point in time when nd/n ≥ θc, growth will come to a halt.13
Under the maintained assumptions, replication may fail due to the fact that a country, i, starts out with
a disproportionately large number of blueprints. If, for instance, ni
mxm > Li, then replication is not
feasible, as country i does not have enough resources to manufacture the integrated equilibrium outputs




R + Yi, (22) is satisﬁed with strict equality in a steady state with Li
R and Yi positive, it follows
that if the world economy is close to its steady state initially, then (22) will hold. Moreover, the
problem vanishes altogether under assumptions more conducive to the possibility of replication. To see
this, assume that intermediates invented in one country can be manufactured in a diﬀerent country,
i, either within multinational ﬁrms or via international patent licensing. Assume further that once
imitation is possible in one country, i, it is possible in each country, i = 1,...,m (“simultaneous
imitation”). Then, all production activities are “footloose”. Equation (23) is satisﬁed, for instance,
for ˙ ni/˙ n = ni
c/nc = ni
m/nm = Y i/Y = Li/L (and for many other allocations of productive activities
across countries as well). This proves:
COROLLARY 4: Let the conditions of Proposition 2 be satisﬁed. Then, with simultaneous imitation
and either multinational ﬁrms or international patent licensing, the no-growth trap described in Propo-
sition 2 is an equilibrium of the world economy if nd/n > θc.
5 Conclusion
This paper is concerned with the question of how competition with “cheap”, i.e., old or traditional,
goods aﬀects the incentives to enter markets with new, innovative products. It shows that no growth
may be better than some growth and that both a closed economy and a world economy made up
of several countries engaged in free trade with each other may get stuck in a no-growth trap. As a
result, growth-enhancing policies may be misguided, and quick deregulation as well as quick trade
liberalization possibly lead to avoidable stagnation in the long term.
13To maintain growth, one has to wait for a point in time where nd/n < θc, or one has to choose a non-stationary
path of the imitation rate, ψ, which prevents too much competition. A thorough analysis would require announcement
eﬀects and/or explicitly making ψ non-stationary.
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